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Abstract 
In this context we will oversee to understand if and in which measure, the 
intentional attitude delineated today by the school of Anglo-Saxon thought 
and, in particular, by Dennett’s philosophy, can constitute an opportune 
and effective instrument for the analysis of the public language. With the 
expression “intentional system” we refer to the addressee of the 
communicative enterprise: a collectivity of people joined by the sharing a 
physical space and a temporal time; such a system can be explained, 
rationalized and, possibly, anticipated (as for its actions and to its 
behaviors) through the attribution to it of shared convictions and desires, 
which constitute the common sense of that organism. 
The so delineated philosophy of intentionality becomes, in this within, 
hermeneutics of the speech held by the then Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi to the Chamber of Deputies on May, 13 2008, that is in occasion 
of the beginning of its IV legislature.  
The exposure of the former prime Minister insisted, in order to guarantee 
to his own government the necessary consent, on the baggage of convictions 
and desires shared by the Italians, in an historical moment of confusion and 
political-institutional instability. That speech evidenced proper values of 
the cultural and ideological matrix of Italy: the house, the family, the 
entrepreneurial increase of North, the elimination of the organized crime 
in the South, the tax reduction on the job of the entrepreneurs, individual 
safety, the removal of the material causes of the abortion. Such concepts 
were introduced in order to attract the interest of a conservative public 
opinion and to diverge the attention from the substance of that 
government’s action, that realized itself in a plan of drastic reduction of the 
job in Public Administration and of increase of the tax charge, in the picture 




The effectiveness of the intentional strategy in the analysis of the 
political language:  Berlusconi's speech at the Chamber of Depu-
ties on the 13th May 2008. 
Comprehensive relation 
This paper intends to analyze if and to what extent the intentional stance as 
described in the Anglo-Saxon school of thought and, in particular, in the 
philosophy of Dennett83,  can constitute an appropriate and efficient instru-
ment in the analysis of political language.  This research concerns the mo-
tives, development dynamics and the objectives themselves of the oratory 
universe of politicians,  whose discourse techniques have as their objective, 
public persuasion.  With the expression "intentional system"84 (here used 
in an exclusively socio-political sense). We are referring to the addressee of 
any communicative intent:  a group of people sharing a physical space  and 
temporal time, which become the aggregating elements of a social organ-
ism;  such a system can be explained, rationalized and, consequently, antic-
ipated (as far as its actions and behavior are concerned) through the attrib-
ution of shared  beliefs and desires, that for such an organism constitute a 
form of orientation criteria. 
The intentional stance pertains to a heuristic methodology which enables 
man/hermeneut  to analyze a cluster of happenings, so as to reduce them 
to an action/reaction dynamics realized by systems that, having a language 
and rationality, will act in a conscious way.   The scope of such a hermeneu-
tic strategy85 is to identify the reasons behind the  actions and thoughts of 
a society,  in such a way that we are able to predict its effects in the social, 
political and economic  fields.  This prediction, closely approximated to the  
reality of shared behavior, will be possible only if a careful and detailed 
recognition is carried out (this constitutes the essence of intentionality) of 
the quantity of  pre-comprehensions86 that, in terms of beliefs and desires, 
constitute the socio-cultural humus which permeates society.  What we 
have to do is to identify, on the basis of the thought of a given historical 
community, what direction will constitute  the most rational and efficient 
actions for the members/agents of that specific social structure. 
                                                             
83 Dennett D., Contenuto e coscienza, tr. it. di G. Pacini Mugnai, Il Mulino, Bo-
logna 1992, p. 39.  
84 ID., Brainstorms. Saggi filosofici sulla mente e la psicologia, tr. it. di L. Cola-
santi, Adelphi, Milano 1991, p. 37. ID., Dove nascono le idee, tr. it. di F. Garofoli, 
Di Renzo, Roma 2006, p. 28.  
85 Cfr. Gadamer H. G., Verità e metodo, tr. it. di G. Vattimo, Bompiani, Milano 
1983, pp. 349-57.  
86 Ivi, pp. 552-57.  
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The first aspect to look into concerning intentional systems as understood 
in this way,  is that if we are to speak about any intentional system, on the 
one hand, we must begin a discussion, on the other, we must analyze  with 
one or more of the intentional actors,  what constitutes their interpretative 
strategies, what can be considered a rational prediction of the behavior of 
the others87. 
From a political point of view (regarding the efficacy that  a good commu-
nicative technique by the orator can have on the acquisition of public con-
sent) the right attitude to have regarding any potential electoral sys-
tem/corpus, is to ask oneself which is the most rational move to make88, 
once you have gathered all the starting information, concerning precisely 
the objectives to reach for the people, the socio- economic conditions in 
which it has lived up to that precise moment,  its expectations regarding any 
new political direction; in other words, the data that photograph the pre-
sent day status quaestionis. 
The adoption of an investigative attitude is particularly significant in the 
elaboration of the prediction of the behavior of other people, that is, the 
adoption of an investigative attitude which is teleologically orientated with 
the purpose of identifying and understanding the objectives of an inten-
tional system.  It is not possible to elaborate a reliable prediction,  without 
being able to establish, with a good level of precision, the nature of the   in-
formation which the public opinion possesses in a given historical moment 
together with the objectives that the actors of a community want to reach,  
projected towards the future in social, political and economic terms. 
It should be clear, at this point, what we mean with the concepts of inten-
tional system and intentional stance.  The inclination of our mind to admit 
presuppositions of rationality in the system it wants to analyze,  is what we 
call intentional stance and the social organism that is interpreted according 
to this prospective, is what constitutes the intentional system89. 
The interpretation of future behavior of a society is realized on the basis of 
the information and scopes that we ourselves attribute to it. Consequently, 
in relation to a historically determined social corpus, we can define the fol-
lowing in this manner: 
                                                             
87 Dennett D., Brainstorms …, op. cit., p. 42.  
88 Ivi, p. 43.  
89 Ivi, p. 47.  
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    1) beliefs90, a mix of its traditions, uses and customs which have 
in time been interiorized, as well as the influence that these habits 
have in structuring shared thoughts; 
    2)  desires,  desired objectives of each member of a community 
considering him/her as a  part of the whole. 
When one tries to explain the working of a system on the basis of a universe 
of beliefs and desires which are attributed to it,  one arrives at what can be 
effectively considered a theory of behavior.   In the light of this considera-
tion it is important to establish the relationship between intentional models 
and other explicative criteria of behavior itself. 
Rationality certainly  constitutes an extremely important pillar  of our in-
tentional system regarding our interpretation of the world, in fact  man is 
not usually ready for an irrational reaction in facing specific events.   The 
person protagonist of any intention,  is so used to considering the existence 
of a strong rational basis to the intentional system, that he is not often ready 
to accept failure in his own system of predictions91.   When our predictions 
of a system are revealed as false by factual proof,  rather than doubting the 
effective rationality of an intentional system, we tend to correct, re-analyze 
and update the conditions through which the information was communi-
cated and the real scopes of that system.   This can reveal itself to be mis-
leading, because as the history of thought has taught us, man is composed 
of both a rational and an irrational part, which is strongly linked to impulses 
and desires.  It can happen that the latter can sometimes dominate on the 
former in the elaboration of collective thought92. 
 
It is not always true, in realizing any strategy of behavior, that a system fol-
lows a regular pattern, in some cases, it can assume unpredictable decisions 
that go far beyond any predicable framework. 
What had been elaborated above, poses another stronger objection, creat-
ing many problems to our discussion so far: the inferential rules of an in-
tentional system are not necessarily valid, because some of them may not 
be the verifying criteria of logic;  in this sense our attempts to give a sense 
                                                             
90 ID., Rompere l’incantesimo. La religione come fenomeno naturale, tr. it. di S. 
Levi, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2007, p. 215, ID., Brainstorms …, op. cit., pp. 57-
60, Peirce C.S., Caso, amore e logica, Introduzione di M.R. Cohen, tr. it. di N. e 
M. Abbagnano, Taylor, Torino 1956, pp. 28-30. 
91 Dennett D., Brainstorms …, op. cit., p. 47.  
92 Ibidem. 
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to the actions of an intentional system can become sterile and unsuccess-
ful93. 
This is when common sense assumes a particularly important role94, be-
coming a lifeline in the difficult task of the intentional subject who has to 
rely on a rational structure (even only partially)  implicit in any intentional 
system. 
What becomes particularly important, is to understand if, and in what 
terms, common sense can constitute a valid theoretical presumption for the 
construction of a system of beliefs about natural reality that may have an  
epistemological basis. 
Dennett has had the cultural merit,  starting from the Anglo-Saxon lesson, 
of trying to found a psychological theory of common sense, analyzing an 
example and asking questions on the characteristics of magnets and on the 
plausible answers given to these questions by people from different socio-
cultural levels95.  The reply given at a first glance is that certainly magnets 
attract iron.  The second reply would try to supply a description in tech-
nical-scientific terms of the material, explaining all its  chemical character-
istics and the effects these qualities produce in the natural world96. The con-
clusion is that man establishes his first cognitive approach to surrounding 
reality, not on the basis of an abstract technical- scientific exposition, the 
result of a longer or less longer  learning process, but through the existence 
of a common set of thoughts,  shared by that  society, which are substanti-
ated in auctoritas temporis. 
From the moment that terms like belief or desire are an integral part of our 
daily language,  as are magnets, our scope is to specify which elements or 
aspects of reality can be explained intentionally,  basing our work, on the 
analysis of a specific event, on a shared interpretation, founded on common 
sense and, thus on collective beliefs. 
The role of natural beliefs understood as the founding principles of 
knowledge has been asserted by the tradition of Scottish Enlightenment 
and, in particular, by Thomas Reid, who underlined the function of com-
mon sense as a parameter of rational reference for all  human communi-
ties97. 
                                                             
93 Ivi, p. 49.  
94 Reid T., Ricerca sulla mente umana e altri scritti, a cura di A. Santucci, UTET, 
Torino 1975, infra.  
95 Dennett D., L’atteggiamento intenzionale, tr. it. di E. Bassato, Il Mulino, Bologna 
1993, p. 67.  
96 Ibidem.  
97 Reid T., Ricerca …, op. cit., infra.  
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Dennett seems here to be recalling the inductivist position of Reid,  when 
he asserts that we conceive the psychology of common sense as a sort of 
vernacular technique which has been shared and consolidated within a so-
cial community98;  it can be considered the result of a process of observation 
on specific aspects of natural reality,   through which we arrive at the iden-
tification of the general rules99. Something like the characteristics of mag-
nets.  We observe how they attract iron and from that, we elaborate a sys-
tematic theory of their chemical-physical characteristics. 
What meaning should we attribute to the term belief in relationship to the 
psychology of common sense and to its predictive and explicative role 
within a specific context?  The psychology of common sense maintains that 
beliefs are psychic states of individuals,  founded on the transmission of 
information that lead, together with the formation of desires  appropriately 
correlated to the beliefs themselves, to undertake guided actions by the in-
tellect100. 
Moore has analyzed very effectively, from the hedonistic point of view, the 
concept of desire considered as a propulsive stimulus to an intelligent ac-
tion101,  in particular, he affirms that such a concept is generally referred to 
an interior state characterized by the effective non existence  of an object or 
event,  but which is ideally present in our mind and functions as a motivat-
ing factor towards its realization102. 
  The non-realized idea of an object determines in us  a feeling of pleasure 
which, in its turn, produces desire.  This causes a proairetic attitude towards 
the resolution of the action, whose ultimate goal is the obtaining of the ob-
ject of pleasure103.  Only when in our mind  we have the presence of  the 
non realized thought of a pleasure,  can we admit the existence of the pleas-
ure itself that becomes the reason behind the realization of an action orien-
tated towards that objective.  The stimulus to act must, however, be guided 
                                                             
98 Dennett D., L’atteggiamento intenzionale, op cit., p. 71.  
99 Bacone F., Novum Organum, libro II, in Scritti filosofici, a cura di P. Rossi, 
UTET, Torino 1975, pp. 389-91.  
100 Epicuro, Lettera a Meneceo, in Opere, a cura di M. Isnardi Parente, UTET, To-
rino 1974, pp. 201-03. Nussbaum M.C., Terapia del desiderio. Teoria e pratica 
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101 Moore G.E., Principia ethica, tr. it. di G. Vattimo, Bompiani, Milano 1964, 
p.135.  
102 Ibidem.  
103 Ivi, p. 136. 
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by the idea of the object considered as the source of pleasure, and not by 
that of the simple desire itself104. 
  The English philosopher has even spoken of two forms of thought contex-
tual to desire:  first a general one, connected to the idea of pleasure, the 
other, connected to the idea of the object as a source of pleasure.  However 
only the latter can constitute the cause of behavior.  The extent of the im-
portance that reason assumes,  in the deliberative process of the desiring 
subject, is very difficult to establish,  because this an aspect closely linked 
to historical, social and individual contingency. 
  The moral of common sense can be easily applied to very different sectors 
of reality  and,  after all, this is also the case with the intentional technique 
to it related;   it exists in the same way as  a phenomenon, or a religion or a 
language, thus it can be studied and analyzed in depth with an investigative 
approach of the anthropological type105. 
  Anthropological analysis, in particular,  should comprehend, in its vision 
of the psychology of common sense, what each individual,  considered sin-
gularly and as part of the whole,  would include in his own system of beliefs, 
desires, predictions about the others,  however  misleading, wrong or banal 
they may seem.   When an anthropological analysis, stimulated by an exclu-
sively hermeneutic intent,  deconstructs a universe of theories formulated 
by the members of a given community towards a specific phenomenon and 
decrees that they are not true, it is referring to a false ideology or to a false  
conscience.   The role of an ideology, however false it may be, should not be 
scorned, on the contrary, it represents a starting point for planning new 
projects in the sense that it  may open new horizons concerning reflection 
on questions of cultural and social interest.   A false ideology and a set of 
wrong beliefs represent an intentional system founded on a basis which is 
not true. 
  Geertz,  in his analysis on the formation and the role of ideology in social 
contexts,  has clearly demonstrated what risks an anthropologist has to face, 
when he has to interpret the complexity of theories present in a community 
which are considered representative of its own identity.  In particular, he 
considers, that we use two constructs to study the elements that define an 
ideology:  the theory of interest and the theory of tension106.  In the first 
case,  which is the most relevant for us,  ideology is considered similar to a 
weapon,  in the second case, it is considered a corrective instrument.   In 
the theory of interest, ideological declarations are referred  to the general 
                                                             
104 Ibidem.  
105 Dennett D., L’atteggiamento intenzionale, op. cit., p. 72.  
106 Geertz C., Interpretazione di culture, tr. it. di E. Bona, Il Mulino, Bologna 1987, 
pp. 256-58.  
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context of a race for power seen from the sort of utilitarian point of view.   It 
is because of this, that such a construct presupposes an extremely low level 
of psychological complexity107.  The existence of social systems that direct 
their choices on the basis of interest, implies the possibility of manipulating 
consensus by the dominating elites,  exploiting the natural tendency of hu-
man beings in their desire to satisfy their own needs.  Such satisfaction can 
often have a purely transitory or illusory nature, not based on any solid and 
rational motivation and can be considered the symptom of a general ab-
sence of any critical conscience. From this point of view an efficient inten-
tional strategy should insert itself in this vacuum  of opinion,  building up 
the basis for the conquest of a hegemony. 
 The human being who thinks and acts on the basis of an intentional stance, 
continually  resorts  to the psychology of common sense to try and predict 
his and other people's behavior,  attributing beliefs and desires and, thus, 
describing the world in intentional terms. 
 The intentional strategy based on the development of common sense can 
present obviously some weak points,  such as for example, the inability to 
explain, even retrospectively,   certain types of behavior, especially if they 
are exceptional or abnormal compared to ordinary mental frames of mind 
belonging to their own social context. 
However some strong points can be traced,  consistent with what has been 
said above, in that the psychology of common sense, in tracing back the ac-
tions and behavior of a system to a series of elements of  pre-comprehen-
sion (beliefs and desires) that belong to it, succeeds in describing the origins 
of actions themselves, conferring to them a meaning in a specific historical 
context108. 
 The attribution of  meaning does not imply, however,  in itself, the moral 
correctness of a shared decision, it only means that a choice that has been 
made by a social community is seen in  a neutral motivational context where 
that choice constitutes a theoretical framework of reference. 
 In other words,  we consider each other reciprocally as if we were everlast-
ing rational agents and the capacity of using intellect to acquire a critical 
awareness of the natural need inherent to our species,  allows us to possess 
a reliable previsional system on the behavior of other people. 
In this sense (always considering the psychology of common sense as a her-
meneutics of behavior) we could trace back the totality of the actions of a 
community to a form of logical behavior which can be formulated in terms 
                                                             
107 Ibidem.  
108 Dennett D., L’atteggiamento intenzionale, op. cit., pp. 74-75.  
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of the inclination to act in a certain way, only when certain events have oc-
curred.  What sort of events are we talking about?  Actual circumstances 
that are free of all historical- social conditioning. 
This would lead us to admit, within the relationship between the intentional 
subject and the intentional system, the existence of a reductionist logic109, 
based on a communicative dynamics regulated by the stimulus- response  
binomial,  in which habit plays a fundamental role. 
In referring to his criticism of Cartesian body-mind dualism, Ryle main-
tains that mental acts are not different to body acts  and the reasons why a 
person acts in a certain way,  are determined by real dispositions that an 
individual possesses to act in such a way in specific situations110. 
The example of the clown111 is particularly significant, whose ability is 
shown in the acrobatics he performs.  He succeeds in his programmed 
clumsiness in evoking laughter and cheerfulness in the people looking at 
him;  but the enjoyment of the spectators in the hic et nunc of the perfor-
mance is not determined by a rational reflection on the anthropological 
conditions that, in the course of decades, have made clowns become a sort 
of cathartic figures in the eyes of society.   Fun and evasion are simply guar-
anteed, according to Ryle, by the simple observation of the efficient perfor-
mance by the artist.   The latter, in his turn, in  stimulating collective enter-
tainment, does not carry out  any form of reason or meta-cognition on the 
sense of his execution.  His acts are simply the effect of consolidated dispo-
sitions that in time, have produced a specific result on the basis of an exclu-
sively sensorial communication between the intentional/public system and 
the intentional/clown subject. 
Can an  approach of this sort  really contribute to presenting the mind as a 
scientific concept?   If we really believed this, we would remove from the 
intentional stance and system, that historical-anthropological and herme-
neutic rationality in which they are  on the contrary impregnated. 
Geertz on the case of the clown described by Ryle, maintains that only phys-
ical gestures can be reduced to the stimulus-response binomial as in the 
behaviorist prospective,  not the ability112.  The latter is a concept that con-
tains a multiplicity of meanings and interior references (concerning the 
mind of the clown) and exterior references (historical-social).   In the con-
                                                             
109 Ivi, p. 77, but also Wittgenstein L., Ricerche filosofiche, tr. it. di R. Piovesan, 
Einaudi, Torino 1999, p. 108.  
110 Ryle G., Il concetto di mente, tr. it. di G. Pellegrino, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2007, 
p. 33.  
111 Geertz C., Interpretazione …, op. cit., p. 107.   
112 Ibidem.  
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cept of ability and in the way it manifests itself,  we must consider the emo-
tional universe of the circus artist,  the way in which the circus as a social 
institution has meant to propose, in the course of its history, this entertain-
ment service which belongs to it, as well as continuing  the tradition of 
thought, that in its imitation of irrationality,  has suggested the possibility 
of its own critical deconstruction113.  
The American anthropologist traces back the abilities of an individual to the 
desire to put them into practice that, in their turn, will be based on a socio-
cultural system interiorized by the single person. 
The conclusion that emerges from what has been said so far on the charac-
teristics of the intentional stance and on its  possible modality of approach 
to reality, is that intentionality, if it is to be efficient, can not disregard com-
mon sense. 
The latter can be described as: 
the outcome of an inductive proceeding meant to identify specific phenom-
ena, from which general rules for action can be obtained; 
a process of volition directed to obtaining pleasure, through the mental rep-
resentation of the object that, of that pleasure, constitutes the source; 
the critical deconstruction of a socially relevant happening, realized on an 
ideological basis.  
The relationship that comes between intentionality and common sense can 
constitute the theoretical basis of reference within which we can insert the 
analysis of a political speech that constitutes  a perfect example of the an-
nulment of public dialectics between what is known as the  'legal' country 
and the 'real' country. 
We are referring to the inauguration speech pronounced at the Chamber of 
Deputies on the 13th May 2008  by Silvio Berlusconi, on the occasion of the 
beginning of his fourth experience as head of the Italian Government. 
   His e xposition exploited (as he had done in his speeches  during the po-
litical meetings in the election campaign  preceding the victorious elections 
of the 13th-14th April) 
a core of beliefs and expectations historically shared by Italian society,  
which needed to be concretely reassured in moments of political and insti-
tutional confusion and instability.  Thus that  speech underlined the real 
values of the cultural and ideological core beliefs of Italy,  which  partly went 
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back to the Risorgimento: the home, the family, the gap114 between the in-
dustrialized North and a backward South victim of organized crime115,  the 
reduction of public debt116, cutting labour taxation for entrepreneurs,  in-
dividual security,  the removal of the material causes of abortion.   These 
concepts were introduced to attract the interest of conservative public opin-
ion and to distract attention from the substance of that government action, 
which in a short period of time, would carry out a program of drastic reduc-
tion of civil service  jobs and in increase in taxation in the midst of progres-
sive and general economic recession. 
  The intentional stance and the contextual attribution of beliefs and values 
to Italian civil society contained in the speech made on the 13th May 2008,  
found their ratio essendi on recuperating  two historically significant expe-
riences, which good or bad, have strengthened the common sense of Ital-
ians in the last one and half centuries of history:  the epic of the Risorgi-
mento and the Fascist dictatorship.   Both are present in the speech we are 
analyzing, in that they condition contents and form. 
  The first aspect which is evident in Berlusconi's exposition, as far as the 
argument of our paper is concerned, regards the incipit.  The subject he 
quotes at the beginning of the speech is Italian society,  an intentional sys-
tem impregnated with meaning, values and expectations which have to be 
rationalized, administered, orientated in the direction of the acquisition of 
consensus.  
 In particular, Berlusconi's rhetoric recuperates the Risorgimento lesson, 
using it as an instrument of  seduction of the common sense of Italians re-
spect to: 
1)the declared will to resolve the economic-productive crisis of the indus-
tries of Northern Italy, which was expressed with the following words:  
"growing means listening to the cry of pain coming from the North and from 
the European standards of work and stagnation117".  
                                                             
114 Duggan C., La forza del destino. Storia d’Italia dal 1796 a oggi, Laterza, 
Roma-Bari 2008, pp. 298-301. Romeo R., L’Italia liberale: sviluppo e contraddi-
zioni, Il Saggiatore, Milano 1987, pp. 268-73. Romanelli R., L’Italia liberale (1861-
1900), Il Mulino, Bologna 1979, infra.  
115 Del Boca A., Italiani, brava gente? Un mito duro a morire, Neri Pozza, Vicenza 
2005, pp. 57-66. Candeloro G., Storia dell’Italia moderna, vol. V: La costruzione 
dello Stato unitario. 1860-1871, Feltrinelli, Milano 1968, pp. 164-69. 
116 Carfagna L, Dualismo e sviluppo nella storia d’Italia, Marsilio, Venezia 1989, 
pp. 288-93. 
117 Berlusconi S., Discorso alla Camera dei Deputati del 13 Maggio 2008, ver-
sione digitale scaricata da Internet http://www.affaritaliani.it/politica/discorsointe-
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This affirmation is an evident recall of the words pronounced by King Vit-
torio Emanuele II to the Parliament on the 10th January 1859 at the time of 
the beginning of the Second War of       Independence:  "we are not insensi-
ble to the cry of pain rising from many parts of Italy towards us".  This lin-
guistic analogy is used to remove the political-institutional discourse from 
its historical context,  depriving it of all the necessary references to present 
day conditions,  which must constitute  the core of every critical debate. It 
has also the function of evoking in public opinion (through resorting to the 
myth of the Second War of Independence) the idea of a patriotic war against 
a common enemy.   This is also a way of diverting public attention from the 
difficulties of contemporary reality; 
2)   to the necessity of adopting rigorous taxation policies to solve the prob-
lem of the Italian public debt. In this case  Berlusconi also  manages to re-
cuperate in both, contents and form, the example of the Risorgimento. The 
problem of public deficit has always been present right from the beginning 
of the Unification of Italy, for    this reason it can not be considered a novelty 
to place it as a point in the program of the government.  In presenting to 
the Chamber of Deputies and to the nation the necessity of realizing a severe 
fiscal policy to put the accounts in order,  Berlusconi affirms that taxes "con-
stitute the counterpart the citizens owe to the State for the services they 
receive and are therefore the premise and guarantee of the good functioning 
of public services118".  The ex-Prime Minister,  uses for persuasive objec-
tives,  the didactic technique typical of the pedagogic literature of the Risor-
gimento,  which had had the aim of educating and instructing people which      
were virtually illiterate119.   What is evident, once again, in both, the style 
and tone of the speech, is how its political prospective is removed from its 
historical context and actualized without resorting this time, to any explicit 
references at the linguistic level. 
The Risorgimento was an extremely complex period,   associated to a pro-
found political-instititutional ambiguity regarding especially government 
organisms120.  In this historical phase Italy demonstrated, once again, that 
it did not possess a diplomatic-military personality strong enough to allow 
it to resolve independently all the questions connected to the occupation of 
its territories by foreign powers.   But it was the occasion for the birth of an 
inspiring collective feeling,  based on the exaltation of the values of family 
                                                             
118 Ibidem.  
119 De Mauro T., Storia linguistica dell’Italia unita, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1991, pp. 
36-44. 
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and nation, that has witnessed  in certain types of generational literature 
(like Cuore by De Amicis) the cultural basis of reference for the construction 
of the idea of Nation121.  An idea that anticipates, with the notion of the 
ordinary and respectable bourgeois, the homologation of conscience typical 
of a fascist society122.  It's to this Risorgimento that Berlusconi's speech ap-
peals, to orientate the common sense of Italians in getting them to welcome 
favorably the new political course. 
The fascist ideology that has just been quoted, regulates the tone of the 
speech, influencing its style.  We notice in different moments, how the ora-
tor manages to demonize  the enemy.  Berlusconi's wish in the initial part 
of the speech to the Chamber of Deputies, that "debating  ideas and inter-
ests (....) should not degenerate into fighting", putting "respect in the place 
of bigotry (....) lively polemics in the place of a paralyzingly guerrilla warfare 
(....) the beauty of politics (....) in the place of demagogy, mere chatter, the-
atricality and deception123." 
He structures his role to appear as a victim, as if he were to be continually 
discredited, attacked and defamed, as if his majority were to be involved in 
a continual state of war.  But who against?   The feared enemy is never spec-
ified, it appears in the speech as a general, abstract category. 
Italian public opinion has preserved, in the course of decades, the myth of 
personal security,  seen through the eyes of twentieth century conservative 
thought,  as the indestructible bastion of national identity124,  an instru-
ment used to legitimize consensus and a remnant of fascist ideology,  re-
peated in the popular saying that during the twenty years of Fascism " you 
could sleep with your doors open".   The security of any citizen is a central 
aspect of the common sense of Italians, especially in the South, where after 
the dissolution of the Bourbon regime,  the integrity of the subjects who 
faced the menace of  brigands, was one of the  central questions of  newly 
born unified Italy125.  
                                                             
121 Chabod F., L’idea di nazione, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1998, pp. 17-23.  
122 Cannistraro P.V., La fabbrica del consenso. Fascismo e mass-media, Laterza, 
Roma-Bari 1975, pp. 419-24. De Grazia V., Consenso e cultura di massa 
nell’Italia fascista. L’organizzazione del dopolavoro, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1981, pp. 
190-92 e 212-15.  
123 Berlusconi S., Discorso …, cit.. 
124 Melossi D., Andamento economico, incarcerazione, omicidi e allarme sociale 
in Italia: 1863-1994, in AA.VV., Storia d’Italia – Annali vol. XII, Einaudi, Torino 
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Berlusconi affirms that "security is a synonym of liberty and (....) it is pre-
cisely  on the protection of individual security that the pact of union be-
tween citizens and the legitimization of public power is founded. 
The declamatory fascist style returns in the conclusive part of the speech, 
when the ex-Prime Minister, invokes, as support for the political action of 
his own government, "the help of God". 
Once again we have an irrational streak, which together with anti-historical 
and clerical aspects which we have already talked about, produce the abso-
lute absence of any critical thought. 
Italian history has underlined, both in the medieval age and in the modern 
age, the general lack of a political and civil conscience of society126. This has 
been seen in three ways: 
the incapacity of Italy, manifested various times, of freeing itself from the 
occupation of the different foreign powers  by itself; 
the presence of the Vatican, symbol of the central power of the Catholic 
Church, that has exercised, in the course of centuries, influence in the ethi-
cal, political and social fields127; 
the lack of any revolutionary experience capable of de-structuring (on the 
English and French models) the existing institutional order,  so as to rede-
fine in the long term,  new forms of political equilibrium. 
The only one historically important experience in a revolutionary sense 
shared by the Italian people was the Resistance Movement to the Nazi-Fas-
cist occupation, where the protagonists were the Partisan forces  during the 
Second World War128. These events, especially with the intervention of the 
Anglo-American forces led to the break-up of the Fascist regime and to 
eventual National Liberation. This speech by Berlusconi represents an ef-
fective demonstration of how a universe of values, convictions and hopes of 
a community, can be intentioned on the basis of historical rationality which 
                                                             
126 Tanzarella S., Gli anni difficili. Lorenzo Milani, Tommaso Fiore e le esperienze 
pastorali, Il pozzo di Giacobbe, Trapani 2007, p. 41. Altan C. T., La coscienza 
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80 e 182-84.  
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has as its purpose individualizing models of contemporary public opinion, 
in order to orientate consent.  The historicizing hermeneutics of the power 
structure has as its object, depriving the intentional system of any syn-
chronic approach to reality, through a  de-historicizing  process of the po-
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